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Modern constitutionalism and patriotism in the Dutch
Constitution of 1798
Peter A.J. VAN DEN BERG *
Abstract
Since the end of the eighteenth century, many states have adopted a written
constitution as the foundation of their political system. Most of these constitutions
include mechanisms designed to protect the individual against the state, such as
universal rights and the separation of powers. For that reason, this development
can rightly be labelled as the ‘rise of modern constitutionalism’. Constitutions
should not, however, only be associated with the establishment of democracy and
limited government. They also have an integrative function, in the sense that they
are meant to provide the polity they encompass with an identity. In this way, they
also contribute to the process of state and/or nation building. Obviously, there can
be some tension between these two aspects of constitutions. In other words, the
implementation of the principles of modern constitutionalism might be influenced
by the state formative elements of a constitution. The aim of this paper is to explore
this tension by describing to what extent the principles of modern constitutionalism
were incorporated in Dutch Constitution of 1798. After all, the authors of this
Constitution were not only inspired by principles of democracy and limited
government, but they were also fierce patriots, determined to restore the Dutch
Republic to its former position as a global player.
1. Two aspects of modern constitutions
Modern constitutionalism is usually associated with the establishment of
democracy and limited government, and rightly so. Many constitutions that have
been adopted in the past two centuries contain devices aimed at assigning political
influence to citizens and at curtailing the power of state institutions.1) They
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1) Cf. for the term ‘constitution’: G. Sartori, “Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion” in:
The American Political Science Review 56 (1962), 853-864.
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proclaim popular sovereignty, universal human rights and several other
mechanisms designed to protect the individual against the state, such as the
separation of powers. Unsurprisingly, scholars have tried to identify which of these
mechanisms are essential to modern constitutionalism. Henkin describes eight
elements that are present in most Western constitutions, whereas Dippel provides us
with a list of ten principles, or ‘essentials’ of modern constitutionalism, all related
to the goals of democracy and limiting government.2)
Modern constitutions are, however, not only about the rise of democracy and
limited government. They are also ideological sites, providing a specific structure
to society and a justification for this structure.3) Such constitutions claim an
autonomous and superior political legitimacy and are, therefore, normative.4) Baxi
is, perhaps, the fiercest supporter of this view.5) He is critical of the dominant
tradition in which narratives of liberal constitutional progress abound. He
emphasises that constitutions often contain elements of state formative practices
and that for that reason constitutionalism is also relevant to the exploration of
practices of identity and nation building. He points to the foundational violence of
an inaugural constitutional text that results from these practices. Constitutionalism
inevitably has a propensity for violent exclusion, he argues. This is also true for
contemporary constitutionalism, despite the efforts of many scholars to present
these as void of ideological content. Baxi concludes that ‘comparative
constitutionalism needs further anchoring, going beyond prescriptive, admonitory
knowledges concerning Habermasian/Rawlsian “constitutional essentials”’.
In the same vein, Arjomand states that the primary purpose of the first written
constitutions of the late eighteenth century was the definition of the political
community.6) The polity they were addressing had to be delineated. They, therefore,
2) L. Henkin, “Elements of constitutionalism” in: The Review. International Commission of
Jurists, 60 (1998), 11-22. L. Henkin, “A new birth of constitutionalism: genetic influences
and genetic defects” in: M. Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, identity, difference and
legitimacy. Theoretical perspectives (Durham/London 1994), 39-53. H. Dippel, “Modern
constitutionalism, an introduction to a history in need of writing” in: The Legal History
Review 73 (2005), 153-169.
3) Cf. J. Tully, Strange multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (Cambridge 1995),
7-9, 58-60 and 66-68.
4) P.L. Lindseth, ‘”Weak” constitutionalism? Reflections on comitology and transnational
governance in the European Union’ in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21/1 (2001), 145-
163 (145).
5) U. Baxi, “Constitutionalism as a site of state formative practices” in: Cardozo Law Review
21 (2000), 1183-1210 (1192 and 1210).
6) S.A. Arjomand, “Law, political reconstruction and constitutional politics” in: International
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provided criteria for membership of the nation and, thus, constituted the basis of
nation building. In the course of the nineteenth century, constitutions also served as
instruments of state building. They were used to centralise the institutions of the
state. He subsequently states that in the twentieth century, many – although not all -
constitutions were founded on an ideological basis. In that era, they were
instruments of social transformation. This is true for the constitutions of many
decolonised countries, of which Indonesia may serve as an example. There, the
constitutional documents adopted after the declaration of independence in 1945
were all based on the five principles of the Pancasila.7) The constitutions of the
former communist countries in Europe belong to that category, too. Finally, since
the Second World War, religion has also proved to be an important ideological
basis for the constitutions of many new countries. Various Islamic countries, such
as Iran and Saudi Arabia, provide obvious examples. Israel should also be counted
in that category, having chosen the Jewish religion and identity for its foundation.
Finally, the views of Ackerman merit some attention. He argues that a
constitution often marks the new beginning of a state which is in need of an identity
of its own. In such a state, a constitution can act as a powerful symbol of national
identity. It can acquire the status of a culturally significant symbol.8) The
development of the European Union might provide us with an example of this.9)
Having started as an intensive form of regional cooperation, it seems to have turned
into something which resembles a process of state formation. Admittedly, it is
debated whether this Union can already be considered a ‘state’. However, the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, rejected by the electorates of both
France and the Netherlands in 2005, clearly contained elements of state formative
practices. Art. I-8 of this Draft Treaty lays down the symbols of the Union, such as
a hymn, a flag and an anniversary. These are traditional instruments of nation
building. The incorporation of a European citizenship might also be seen as a
contribution to the concept of a European people.10)
Sociology 18/1 (2003), 7-32 (16).
7) E. Darmaputera, Pancasila and the search for identity and modernity in Indonesian society
(Leiden 1988), 155-165.
8) B. Ackerman, “The rise of world constitutionalism” in: Virginia Law Review 83 (1997),
771-797 (783).
9) C.N. Shore, Building Europe: the cultural politics of European integration (London 2000).
A. Hurrelmann, “European Democracy, the ‘Permissive Consensus’ and the Collapse of the
EU Constitution” in: European Law Journal 13 (2007), 343-359 (344-345).
10) Art. I-10 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Cf. Peter A.J. van den Berg,
“The integrative function of constitutions: a historical perspective” in: F. Amtenbrink/Peter
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Including these elements in the Draft Treaty is not without consequences. The
constitutionalisation of the European Union sometimes induces proposals for the
introduction of elements designed to support nationhood in constitutions of well
established states in which the constitutional principles are fully developed, such as
the Netherlands. There, the government has set up a National Convention, charged
with the evaluation of the Dutch constitutional order. It is suggested that in view of
the developments of the European Union this temporary advisory panel should
describe the essential national competences and interests, including aspects such as
Dutch language, culture and history.11) It is argued that some of these aspects of
Dutch identity might deserve special attention in the Dutch Constitution, in order to
protect them against interference by European institutions.
Obviously, there is some tension between the two aspects of constitutions. Quite
rightly, Baxi speaks of the ‘troubled relationship between constitutionalism and
state formative practices’.12) The incorporation and implementation of the
principles of modern constitutionalism is often influenced by the state formative
elements of a constitution. A new state in need of a new identity will not only pay
more attention to state building provisions, it will also mitigate the mechanisms that
limit government and implement popular sovereignty in so far as they might
hamper the development of the nation. If in the course of time, the state becomes
more secure, if the process of nation building is well on its way, the mechanisms to
limit government might subsequently be augmented and better implemented.
Exploring the state formative aspect of constitutions can, therefore, provide an
explanation for the development of the mechanisms designed to introduce
democracy and limit government.
The aim of this paper is to describe to what extent the principles related to
popular sovereignty and limited government were actually implemented in the first
national Dutch Constitution of 1798 under the influence of the patriotic impulse.
This Constitution provides a good opportunity to study the tension between both
aspects of constitutionalism, because the authors of this Constitution were not only
inspired by principles of limited government and democracy, but were also fierce
patriots, as will be shown shortly. The focus will be on four principles included in
A.J. van den Berg (eds.), The constitutional integrity of the European Union (The Hague
2010), 13-53 (17).
11) A. Pijpers, “Discussie over politiek bestel ook van belang voor Europa” in: De Volkskrant
(9-2-2006), 10. Pijpers is research fellow of the Clingendael European Studies Programme.
12) Baxi, “Constitutionalism as a site of state formative practices”, 1183.
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Dippels’ decalogue, namely popular government, representative government, the
declaration of human rights and the separation of powers. The other principles, such
as independent judiciary, limited government, a constitution as a higher set of rules,
an orderly procedure for changing the constitution, accountable and responsible
government, and finally the foundation of the constitution on general principles,
will be dealt with more succinctly. Specific attention will be given to the way in
which the implementation of these principles was influenced by the efforts to
strengthen the state.
2. The Dutch Constitution of 1798
At the end of the eighteenth century, the feeling of crisis was widespread in the
Republic of the United Netherlands, also referred to as the Dutch Republic.13) This
sentiment was induced by the 4th Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), which had ended
in a disaster for the Republic. It had become abundantly clear that the Republic was
no longer able to defend its maritime empire. A revolutionary movement came into
being, demanding a reform of the constitutional structure of the state in order to
remedy this military weakness. At first, the revolutionaries, who named themselves
‘Patriots’, aimed at restoring what they considered the ‘old constitution’. The
leading principles of this ‘old constitution’ were to be found in the Treaty of
Utrecht (1579), which had been concluded between the Dutch Provinces during
their revolt in the sixteenth century against the centralising efforts of the Spanish
monarch. It remained in force after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when the
independence of the Dutch Republic was internationally recognised. The Treaty of
Utrecht only founded a loose confederation for defensive purposes, in which the
seven provinces were considered to remain sovereign entities. Each of these
provinces was governed by a body called the Provincial Estates, consisting of
representatives of the Three Estates, together with a stadholder who mainly
executed military functions. In this Dutch Republic of United Provinces, there was
one common political body, called the Estates General, made up of delegates from
each of the seven Provinces, dealing with matters of common interest, such as
defence and foreign policy. Regardless of the number of its inhabitants, each
province had only one vote, and for most of the decisions unanimity was required.
In addition, each delegate had a fixed non-negotiable mandate from his Province
according to which he had to cast his vote in the Estates General.
13) Cf. for the history of the Dutch Republic: J.I. Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness,
and fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford 1995).
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According to the Patriots, the present crisis was the result of deviating from this
‘old constitution’. Since 1747, the position of stadholder in all the seven provinces
was held by one person, who was always a member of the House of Orange. In fact,
the stadholderate had become a hereditary function. Thus, it was argued, the
confederal system of sovereign provinces had been replaced by a quasi-centralised
government in the person of the stadholder. Moreover, the Patriots stated that the
system of representation in the Provincial Estates had been corrupted. To a certain
extent, their criticism was justified. In its early days, the Republic was certainly not
a modern democracy. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, all power and
wealth were divided among members of aristocratic families and the stadholder.
The Republic had developed into an oligarchy. The Patriots were determined to
restore the sovereignty of the provinces. They also wished to introduce more
democracy, a more transparent government and more legal certainty for the
individual citizens. In 1787, their revolution was well under way to being
successful, but Prussian forces came to the rescue of the stadholder. The revolution
was crushed and many Patriots went into exile.
In 1795, the Patriots were given a second chance. In the wake of a French
invasion, the Batavian Revolution of 1795 took place and this time their efforts
were not in vain.14) The Old Regime fell and the stadholder was ousted. It marked
the beginning of the Batavian Republic. The term ‘Batavian’, taken from one of the
tribes that lived in the area during Roman times, was used to mark the fundamental
break with the Republic of the United Netherlands. There is no doubt that the
Revolution of 1795 was inspired by the principles of modern constitutionalism as
described by Henkin and Dippel. After all, French revolutionary ideas about
popular sovereignty and limited government had exerted a great influence on the
Dutch revolutionaries, especially those who had spent their exile in France. As a
result, most of the ten principles or ‘essentials’ as included in the list provided by
Dippel, all of them related to the goals of democracy and limiting government, were
discussed in the National Assembly, which convened from 1 March 1796 onwards
after a year of turmoil, while preparing a draft constitution.
The National Assembly consisted for the most part of Patriots, since many
Orangists, supporters of the stadholder, had been excluded from the electoral
process. Despite the fact that most Patriots agreed on the importance of democratic
principles, it took them more than three years to bring about the first Dutch
Constitution. One reason for this delay was the tension between the principles of
14) A. Jourdan, La Révolution batave entre la France et l’Amérique (1795-1806) (Rennes 2008).
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modern constitutionalism and the anxiousness of the patriots to use the new
constitution to strengthen the new Republic’s international position as a maritime
power, able to defend its trade and its colonies. As mentioned above, the
Revolution was also the result of a profound patriotism and it was no coincidence
that the revolutionaries named themselves ‘Patriots’. As a result, most of the
delegates to the National Assembly were convinced that the system of government
should not only be based on democratic principles, but also become more effective
and, thus, more centralised. However, the Patriots became divided over the
necessary degree of centralisation. In the ensuing debate, various options of
government and the mechanisms to limit it were discussed in an attempt to
reconcile the protection of citizens against excessive state power with the
exigencies of effective government.
The resulting compromise, the Draft Constitution (Ontwerp van Constitutie),
was not received favourably in the media. It was a long, detailed and self-
contradictory document in which no clear choice was made for either a unitarist or
a (con)federal state structure. In August 1797, it was rejected by the electorate in a
referendum. One month later, the discussions on the draft constitution were
resumed in a new, second National Assembly. The composition of this second
National Assembly resembled that of its predecessor. The different factions
remained, therefore, divided over the degree of unity necessary to secure the
Republic’s international position and over the way in which liberty should be
attained. In the end, a few radical supporters of a unitary state lost their patience
and staged a coup d’état in late January 1798. They managed to present a draft for a
constitution to the purged National Assembly as early as March 1798. It consisted
of two parts: the Constitutional Principles (Burgerlijke en Staatkundige
Grondregels, or BSG) and the Constitution proper (Acte van Staatsregeling, or
AvS).15) On 23 April 1798, it was accepted by the electorate and entered into
force.16) It remained the constitutional foundation of the Republic until it was
replaced by the Constitution of 1801.
15) See for the (Dutch) text of this Constitution: Peter A.J. van den Berg, “Constitutional
Documents of the Netherlands, 1795-1848” in: F. Stevens/P. Poirier/P.A.J. van den Berg
(eds.), Constitutional Documents of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 1789-1848
(Munich 2008), 417-469.
16) S. Schama, Patriots and liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813 (London
1977), 321.
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3. Ten principles of modern constitutionalism and the patriotic impulse
The authors of the Constitution of 1798 remained faithful to their goal of
introducing democracy and limited government. They included several mechanisms
in order to assign political influence to individual citizens and to protect them
against an excess of state power. However, not all of the ten principles or elements
of constitutionalism as distinguished by Dippel were built into the Constitution.
Moreover, it has already been stated that this Constitution was not only an effort at
democratisation, but also an attempt at bringing about a fundamental reform of the
Republic by creating a unitary and undivided nation state.17) Consequently, unitarist
ideas found their way into it as well. Various provisions proclaimed financial unity,
economic unity, including unity of measures, weights and currency, administrative
unity and legal unity. In addition, the Constitution introduced national celebrations
and a minister for national education, hoping that these elements would foster
fraternity among the citizens and create attachment to laws, the fatherland and
freedom. This resulted often in an uneasy ensemble: some of the constitutionalist
mechanisms were only implemented to a certain extent so that they did not hamper
the construction of the state and the introduction of effective government.
3.1. Popular sovereignty and representative government
There is no doubt that popular sovereignty and representative government,
arguably the two most fundamental principles, constituted the foundation of the
Constitution of 1798. In the Constitutional Principles (BSG) it was stated that the
supreme power in the new Republic rested with the citizens of the Batavian
nation.18) In the second article of the Constitution proper (AvS) this principle was
re-echoed. The representatives derived their power from a mandate granted to them
by the nation. This power was considered inalienable: no individual member or part
of the nation could assume it. According to Article 31 AvS, every member of the
National Assembly was considered to represent the whole Batavian nation, and not
a part thereof. In addition, it was specifically mentioned that the delegates could not
carry a fixed mandate of the province where they had been elected, as had been
customary in the old Republic.
The Constitution proper (AvS) comprised many provisions on how these
representatives were elected.19) There, the limiting effects of the patriotic impulse
17) Cf. also Van den Berg, “The integrative function of constitutions: a historical perspective”,
13-18.
18) Arts. 9 and 13-14 BSG.
19) Arts. 9-39 AvS.
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could be felt. In line with the principle of popular sovereignty, it was an axiom that
all members of the political community, or citizens, should have the right to vote,
provided they were male and met certain criteria with regard to age. The authors of
the Constitution realised, however, that having large parts of the population
involved in the political process also raised the issue of loyalty to the Batavian
state, for example of immigrants.20) At first, they addressed this problem by trying
to define the political community at large in legal terms. Only those inhabitants
who had been granted citizenship of the Batavian Republic would have access to
the political process. Consequently, the presence of a considerable Jewish minority
caused a rather fierce debate in the National Assembly on the delineation of
membership of the Batavian nation in the new constitution. Some delegates argued
that the Jewish population had always lived according to its own laws and traditions
and should, therefore, be regarded as a separate nation. Jews were, thus, not a part
of the Batavian nation and should for that reason be barred from citizenship, despite
the fact that their families often had lived in the Netherlands for centuries. Other
delegates, too, initially tried to link citizenship and political participation, but stated
that those Jews who explicitly chose to become a member of the Batavian nation
should be granted citizenship. This would automatically allow them to vote.
In the end, the Constitution solved the problem of securing the loyalty of those
participating in the political process in a more old-fashioned way. This is hardly
surprising, as the idea of limiting access to the political arena by defining
citizenship in legal terms was new. It was a corollary of the proclamation of the
sovereignty of the nation during the Batavian Revolution. In the Ancien Régime, the
issue of loyalty to the political system had not been a key issue, since only members
of the elite were involved in politics. Moreover, politicians were not elected by
popular vote. There was no need, therefore, to focus on limiting the grant of
citizenship in order to restrict political participation. It was achieved by reserving
the more important public offices for those who had been born on the territory of
the Dutch Republic, or who had at least lived there for a certain number of years. In
addition, candidates had to profess Calvinism, which excluded Roman Catholics,
Jews and Dissenters. The authors of the Constitution of 1798 dropped the religious
requirements as contrary to the principle of equality, but otherwise decided to
continue on the path of their ancestors. Article 11 AvS limited the right to vote to
those who were natives of the Batavian Republic. Immigrants acquired this right
20) Cf. Peter A.J. van den Berg, “We, the people! Democratisation and the delineation of
citizenship in the Netherlands, 1795-1922” in: Osaka University Law Review 58 (2011), 73-
92 (79-80).
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only after having had their domicile in the Republic for at least ten years.
Interestingly, these restrictions were not considered sufficient to secure loyalty to
the nation. In addition, every voter had to sign a declaration, stating his allegiance
to the free and independent Batavian nation. In this way, the Constitution realised
representative popular government, but at the same time limited participation to
those considered loyal members of the nation.
Another issue related to the principles of popular and representative government
was popular influence at a regional level.21) It would have been in line with these
principles to have the population represented at the local level as well. Most
unitarists, however, were not willing to endow local governmental institutions with
too many competences and too much authority, because it might harm the unity and
effectiveness of national government. They, therefore, opposed too much popular
influence on local government. Some of them argued that the nation, being the sole
sovereign, was indivisible and could only be represented once, that is at the national
level. At that level, the executive power was therefore subordinate to the body
representing the nation, as stated in Article 12 AvS. A body only representing the
inhabitants of a district, however, should not be able to remove the executive of this
district.22) After all, such a regionally elected body only represented a small
segment of the nation, whereas the executive government of a district was part of
and subordinate to the national administration. Despite these objections, the
Constitution of 1798 allowed for a certain degree of popular influence on local
government. Both the regional and the municipal administrators were elected by the
people.23) The national interest should at the regional level be secured by
supervisors that were appointed by the national government according to Article
155 AvS.
3.2. Declaration of universal human rights
The third principle, a declaration of universal human rights, was completely
lacking. Interestingly, it was left out on purpose. Jacob van Manen (1752-1822), a
delegate to the National Assembly and an influential member of the first
21) Cf. for this discussion: Peter A.J. van den Berg, The politics of European codification. A
history of the unification of law in France, Prussia, the Austrian Monarchy and the
Netherlands (Groningen 2007), 243-244.
22) Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationaale Vergadering representeerende het volk van
Nederland 9 vols. (The Hague 1796-1798; hereinafter Dagverhaal), vol. III, 678 and 682,
and V, 814.
23) Arts. 162 ff. and 191 AvS.
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constitution committee, had articulated the arguments against such a declaration as
early as 1796.24) Human rights, he argued, only existed in the state of nature. As
soon as people entered a social contract, they traded these rights in on rights and
duties vis-à-vis the society as established in that contract. Since the purpose of this
society was to provide security of life and property to its members, these rights and
duties should be compatible with effective government. Otherwise, the internal and
external safety of the Republic could not be guaranteed and, thus, its goal not be
achieved. It was, therefore, necessary that the rights of citizens in society were
more limited than the rights of men in the state of nature. To be sure, Van Manen
favoured popular government and protection of individual citizens. He was
convinced, however, that a declaration of human rights would jeopardise the
survival of the state. Since the state depended on the obedience of its citizens, it
could not be tolerated that citizens had rights which superseded the interest of the
state. He clearly saw constitutional rights as a part of popular self-government, not
as an external force checking it.25)
Van Manen managed to convince the other members of the first constitution
committee. His ideas also clearly influenced the authors of the Constitution of
1798. As already stated, this Constitution did not include a declaration of universal
human rights. Instead, the Constitution focused on rights that were granted to the
members of society. Admittedly, Article 2 BSG guaranteed that the natural human
rights would not be restricted by the Constitution more than was absolutely
necessary in the interest of society. Many of the rights granted to the members of
society were, however, subject to substantial limitations. It is to some of these
provisions that we turn now.
Article 16 BSG guaranteed freedom of speech, but under the proviso that it was
not used in a way that was detrimental to the objectives of society as a whole.
Article 17 BSG formulated the right of an individual citizen to address
governmental institutions by handing in a petition. At the same time, it was
explicitly stated that only individuals and not corporate groups were allowed to
present such a petition. Article 18 BSG laid down the right of assembly, but again it
was immediately restricted in such a way that the so-called constitutional societies
24) L. de Gou, Het Plan van constitutie van 1796: chronologische bewerking van het archief
van de Eerste Constitutiecommissie (The Hague 1975), 15, 105-106 and 109-110. J. van
Manen, Voorstellen, bedenkingen en ontwerpen tot het daar stellen eener constitutie (The
Hague 1797), 91, 274-275 and 278.
25) Cf. on this theme: J. Rubenfeld, “Two conceptions of constitutionalism” in: Proceedings of
the 96th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (2002), 394-396.
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(constitutionele gezelschappen), which discussed matters of state, were not granted
the right to decide by means of a vote, nor should they perform any public function
as a corporation. The purpose of such limitations was, of course, to prevent private
bodies from interfering with governmental affairs. There should only be one single
sovereign nation and the individual citizens composing it.26) In Article 19 BSG,
freedom of religion was proclaimed. There were limitations to this right as well,
however, expressing some anxiety over the political aspirations of church
institutions that might compete with those of the sovereign nation.27) During
religious services, the doors of the places of worship, such as churches and
synagogues, should remain unlocked. Moreover, it was explicitly prohibited to
wear any clerical vestments or insignia outside church buildings. Unsurprisingly,
the Dutch Reformed Church lost its privileged position as the established church.
The Constitution was also imbued with a spirit of anticlericalism.28)
The least influenced by considerations of national interest were probably the
rights concerning habeas corpus and the protection of individual property. Article
39 BSG clearly stated that authorities could only enter a house if authorised by a
proper warrant. In another BSG provision, it was stated that a person could be
taken into custody according to rules prescribed by law.29) Finally, Article 40 BSG
ruled out any expropriation of personal property, except in cases where this would
be necessary in the public interest and provided that proper compensation be
offered.
3.3. Separation of powers
The fourth principle, the separation of powers, was also heavily debated in the
National Assembly. For delegates who were of a federalist persuasion, acceptance
of this principle did not cause too many problems. The central government was
their natural enemy and they could, therefore, support any proposal that would
diminish its power.30) They referred pointedly to the situation in France where, in
their opinion, excessive centralisation had resulted in an obvious lack of freedom
for individual citizens. Within the unitarist camp, however, intense disagreement
26) Cf. for a critique of using individualism as the sole foundation for a constitutional polity:
M.M. Slaughter, “The multicultural self: questions of subjectivity, questions of power” in:
Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, identity, difference and legitimacy, 369-380.
27) Arts. 22 and 23 BSG.
28) Cf. Art. 33, sub b AvS, which excluded those in clerical service from membership of the so-
called ‘Representative Supreme Power’, the legislative body.
29) Art. 29 BSG.
30) Dagverhaal vol. III, 715, and vol. V, 753-754.
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ensued. Some unitarist delegates argued that a system of separation of powers
would in fact introduce another kind of federalism, endangering the unity of
government and thus its effectiveness. Such a system would also be injurious to
liberty, particularly if authority was granted to bodies that were not elected, such as
the judiciary and the executive. In their view, a unitary constitution without
separation of powers did not necessarily result in a lack of freedom, as long as
citizens were able to control and influence government. This was partly due to the
fact that their constitutional ideas were a reaction to the political system of the
Ancien Régime, which was characterised by a complete lack of popular influence.
In this respect, their situation resembled that of the French revolutionaries. As in
France, the emphasis was, therefore, on implementing popular sovereignty.31) It
was argued that popular influence was the best way to prevent despotism. To some
other unitarists, such as Van Manen, the idea of separation of powers was less
abhorrent. They did not, however, embrace the principle wholeheartedly. It was
accepted that the various functions of government should be exercised by different
bodies, but these bodies would not be of equal importance. Van Manen, for
example, argued that the sovereignty of the nation should rest exclusively in a
legislative body.32) The two other bodies, the executive and the judiciary, were to
be subordinate to it. He explicitly rejected the idea of a supreme court that was able
to pursue its own policies. For that reason, he opposed the suggestion that members
of this court be directly elected by the people. He also emphasised that the supreme
court would exercise its power in the name of the legislative body, not in the name
of the people. To counter the argument that the supremacy of the legislative body
would jeopardise liberty, Van Manen stated that ‘all calamities and catastrophes of
oppression and usurpation that had happened to the Dutch state resulted from an
unlimited executive power, not from an unlimited legislative power’.33)
The latter view with respect to the separation of powers prevailed in the
Constitution of 1798: the principle was implemented, but only to a certain extent.
As is clear from the opening paragraph of the third title of the AvS, three powers
were distinguished, the Representative Supreme Power (Vertegenwoordigende
Hoogste Macht), endowed with legislative competences, the Executive Power
(Uitvoerende Macht), charged with supervising the execution of the law, and the
31) Cf. H. Dippel, “Popular sovereignty and the separation of powers in American and French
revolutionary constitutionalism” in: Amerikastudien 34 (1989), 21-31.
32) Van Manen, Voorstellen, 288. De Gou, Het Plan van constitutie van 1796, 14-115, 123, 137
and 328.
33) Dagverhaal vol. III, 678.
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Judicial Power (Rechterlijke Macht), competent to settle disputes.34) In addition,
Art. 33, sub a AvS ruled out simultaneous membership of the Executive Power and
the Representative Supreme Power. This provision even barred admission of former
members of the Executive to the Representative Power within three years after their
discharge. The three powers were, however, not of equal standing. The
Representative Supreme Power was clearly the most important organ of the
Republic. The superiority of this elected body over the Executive Power follows
from Articles 50, sub l and 84 AvS, which stated that it could appoint the members
of the latter institution. In addition, some important executive competences were
granted to the Representative Supreme Power. It could not only determine the size
of the army and the navy, but it also had the prerogative of mercy.35) The Executive
Power was, thus, subordinate to the Representative Supreme Power, but it was
considered more important than the Judicial Power. In view of the necessity of
effective governance, the authors of the Constitution had obviously no intention to
have these two powers weakened by the Judiciary too much. Article 260 AvS
explicitly forbade judges to interfere with either the Executive Power or the
Legislative Body. At the same time, the Executive Power was granted supervision
over the courts. It was authorised to stay the execution of its sentences and suspend
or even remove its members in case the law was violated.36) In addition, the
Executive Power could appoint a superintendent at every court of law, charged with
supervising the application of law.37) Any breach of law by a judge had to be
reported by these superintendents to the Minister of Justice (Agent van Justitie),
who was a member of the Executive Power charged with the administration of
justice. If this breach constituted a criminal offence, this Minister could bring a case
against the judge before a specialised court. It should be noted, however, that this
court consisted of judges of the ordinary courts. In the end, the case was thus
decided by the judiciary itself and not by the Minister of Justice.
3.4. Independent judiciary, limited government and the pre-eminent status
of the Constitution
The authors of the Constitution also had difficulties implementing a fifth
principle, an independent judiciary. This is hardly surprising since this principle is
closely related to the principle of separation of powers, which had already caused
34) Arts. 50 sub a, 105-107, 272, 276-277 and 279 ff. AvS.
35) Arts. 50, sub d and q AvS.
36) Arts. 107 AvS.
37) Arts. 281 and 288-293 AvS.
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them so many problems. Article 259 AvS stated that no member of the judiciary
could be removed from office except when he had committed a crime while in
office. Moreover, most judges were appointed through an electoral procedure which
resembled the selection of the delegates to the Representative Supreme Power.38)
This limited the influence of the other Powers over the Judiciary. The judges were,
however, not completely free from interference by the Executive Power. As
mentioned above, the courts were controlled by a superintendent appointed by the
latter institution. In addition, the Constitution did not declare that they were
appointed for life. On the contrary, they were obviously appointed for a limited
period since Article 258 AvS stated that judges were eligible for reappointment
after they had stepped down. It is hardly surprising that the principle of an
independent judiciary was implemented somewhat half-heartedly. After all, it was
felt that the exigencies of efficient government called for some control by the
Executive Power over the judiciary.
There is also no doubt that the Patriots were committed to the sixth principle,
which was limited government. Again, the main problem of the authors of the
Constitution was to reconcile this principle with the exigencies of effective
government in view of the international position of the new Republic. The
discussion in the National Assembly on the structure of the Representative Supreme
Power provides a good example. Most of the delegates voted in favour of
bicameralism, in order to prevent the legislative body from becoming despotic.
They explicitly referred to the situation in France, where an undivided Convention
had resulted in chaos and oppression. Some unitarists, however, argued against a
division of this body into two chambers, because it would paralyse the force of
government and legislation.39) In the end, the view of the majority prevailed:
Articles 51 ff. AvS introduced a system of bicameralism. Another mechanism
designed to realise the principle of limited government was restricting the term of
office of the members of the Executive Power and the Representative Supreme
Power to five and three years respectively.40) Members of the Executive Power
could only be reappointed five years after their resignation. Members of the
Representative Supreme Power could only be re-elected for one other term of three
38) Arts. 265-267 and 277 AvS.
39) L. de Gou, Het Ontwerp van Constitutie van 1797. De behandeling van het plan van
constitutie in de Nationale Vergadering 3 vols. (The Hague 1983-1985), vol. I, 18, 39 and
39. L. de Gou, De Staatregeling van 1798. Bronnen voor de totstandkoming 2 vols. (The
Hague 1987-1990), vol. I, 164.
40) Arts. 37-39 and 86 AvS. Art. 6 Reglement C.
72
Modern constitutionalism and patriotism in the Dutch
Constitution of 1798
years. In addition, Article 87 AvS ruled out that members of the Executive Power
were related to each other by family ties. However, realising that frequent renewal
of all the members of these institutions at the same time would be detrimental to
their expertise and thus jeopardise their efficiency, a complex system of rotation
was created. Each year, a third of the members of the Representative Supreme
Power and one member of the Executive Power had to step down.
The seventh principle concerns the pre-eminent status of the Constitution. It
should be considered a higher set of rules, surpassing ordinary legislation. The
Constitution of 1798 does not have any specific provisions in which this principle is
stated. It does contain, however, a few articles limiting the possibilities to revise it.
Article 304 AvS states that the new Constitution could not be amended before
1803, so not within five years after it went into force. It was also laid down that the
Constitution could only be changed after a popular vote on the proposed
modifications.41)  This prevented the Representative Supreme Power from being
able to amend it independently. Since the amendment procedure was more difficult
for the Constitution than for ordinary legislation, one could conclude that it was
considered superior to ordinary laws. It should be noted, however, that this was
probably not the only purpose of these rules. They might also have been designed
to stabilise the new regime in order to secure the achievements of a revolution.42)
The new political order created by the Constitution should end the revolutionary
turmoil, so that a normal course of government action could be followed. The
Constitution was, therefore, presented as a semi-permanent legal document. Unlike
the principles discussed above, the constitutional principle of a constitution as a
higher set of rules was not at odds with the necessity of efficient government. On
the contrary, both pointed in the direction of including provisions that made it more
difficult to alter the Constitution.
3.5. Revision of the Constitution, responsible government and general
principles
The remaining three principles do not seem to have been affected by the need
for effective government. The preceding paragraph shows that the requirements of
the eighth principle, namely that a constitution provides an orderly procedure for its
revision, are fully met. The ninth principle, an accountable and responsible
41) Arts. 304-308 AvS. Art. 70 BSG.
42) U.K. Preuss, “Constitutional powermaking for the new polity: some deliberations on the
relation between constituent power and the constitution” in: Rosenfeld (ed.),
Constitutionalism, identity, difference and legitimacy, 143-164 (144).
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government, can also be found in the Constitution of 1798. Article 12 BSG clearly
stated that all executive bodies were not only subordinate, but also answerable to
the Representative Supreme Power. The Constitution also included some specific
provisions on the accountability of the Executive Power vis-à-vis the
Representative Supreme Power.43) Finally, the Preamble of the 1798 Constitution
stated that it was based on several general principles which were subsequently
elaborated in the Constitutional Principles preceding the Constitution proper. Thus,
the tenth principle, too, was implemented.
4. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper was to describe to what extent the principles of
modern constitutionalism were incorporated in the first national Dutch Constitution
of 1798. The survey clearly shows that the authors of the Constitution of 1798 tried
to remain faithful to their ideal of popular sovereignty and limited government.
Individual citizens were granted political influence and mechanisms were
introduced designed to protect them against excessive state power. Most principles
or elements of constitutionalism described by Henkin and Dippel were included in
the new Constitution. Many of these principles, however, were incorporated in a
way that facilitated the construction of the nation state and secured effective
government. This is hardly surprising, since this Constitution resulted from a
Revolution that was both democratic and patriotic. Its protagonists not only wished
the new state to be based on principles of popular sovereignty and limited
government, but also aimed at creating a nation state that was strong enough to
restore the Republic to its former glory. In accordance with the principles of
popular sovereignty and representative government, for example, a system of
elections was introduced, but there were considerable restrictions. The right to vote
was only granted to those citizens who were considered loyal to the nation: only
natives of the Republic or inhabitants who had been domiciled there for at least ten
years belonged to the electorate. In addition, citizens could only exercise this right
under the proviso that they signed a declaration, stating their allegiance to the free
and independent Batavian nation.
Neither was the principle of separation of powers fully incorporated: the
Representative Supreme Power was clearly established as the most important organ
of the Republic. It is particularly noteworthy that the authors of the Constitution did
not wish the Judicial Power to be able to weaken the Representative Supreme
43) Arts. 124-125 and 134-135 AvS.
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Power or the Executive Power too much. This might explain why the judges were
not completely free from interference by the latter institution. The authors of the
Constitution also tried to reconcile the principle of limited government with the
exigencies of effective government, particularly in view of the international
position of the Republic as a maritime power. To that end, an intricate system of
rotation of the members of the Representative Supreme Power and the Executive
Power was created. The principle that a constitution should have a higher status
than ordinary legislation was also adhered to. This principle might also have been
affected by the necessity for a stable and effective government, but interestingly
this necessity and the constitutional principle pointed in the same direction: a
constitution that was difficult to change.
A striking omission was a declaration of universal human rights, left out
because it was thought that such unrestricted rights might jeopardise the internal
and external safety of the Republic. Instead, the Constitution focused on rights that
were granted to the members of society. Unsurprisingly, many of these rights, such
as the right to petition the government and freedom of religion, were subject to
substantial limitations considered necessary in view of the process of nation
building. The authors of the Constitution were particularly keen on suppressing
religious organisations and secular intermediary groups, such as guilds, that might
rival the nation as the main political and social organisation. This might explain the
dominance of the individualistic and anticlerical ideology in the Constitution.
Finally, the incorporation of the remaining three principles does not seem to
have been affected by the patriotic sentiment. The Constitution provided an orderly
procedure for being amended, embraced accountable and responsible government,
and stated several general principles that were considered its foundation.
It can be concluded that during the Batavian Revolution, the majority of the
principles of modern constitutionalism as formulated by Henkin and Dippel found
their way into the first Dutch Constitution of 1798, but sometimes only to a certain
extent. The way they were incorporated was often influenced by the necessity to
reconstruct the Dutch nation state. We should realise that such influence of state
formative practices on the mechanisms designed to limit government may decrease
when the process of nation building is well advanced. This might result in a better
and more complete implementation of the principles of modern constitutionalism.
To establish this, further research into the subsequent Dutch constitutions of the
nineteenth and twentieth century is needed. We should keep in mind, however, that
such a development is not irreversible. Moreover, it should be noted that more
recently established states might still need elements of state formative practices in
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their constitutions. Obviously, nation building is not only a phenomenon of the
past.
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